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Abstract
We consider repeated games where players behave according to cu-
mulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that a natural analog for the
notion of correlated equilibrium in the CPT case, as defined by Keskin, is
not enough to capture all subsequential limits of the empirical distribu-
tion of action play when players have calibrated strategies and behave
according to CPT. We define the notion of a mediated CPT correlated
equilibrium via an extension of the game to a so-called mediated game.
We then show, along the lines of Foster and Vohra’s result, that under
calibrated learning the empirical distribution of action play converges
to the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria. We also show that,
in general, the set of CPT correlated equilibria is not approachable in
the Blackwell approachability sense. We observe that mediated games
are a specific type of games with communication introduced by Myer-
son, and as a consequence we get that the revelation principle does not
hold under CPT.
1 Introduction
In non-cooperative game theory, a finite n-person game models a social sys-
tem comprised of several decision makers (or players) with possibly different
objectives, interacting in some environment. The notion of equilibrium is
central to game theory. The neoclassical economics viewpoint of game the-
ory attempts to explain equilibrium as a self-evident outcome of the optimal
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behavior of the participating players assuming them to be rational. Two of
the most well known notions of equilibrium for a finite n-person game are
Nash equilibrium [Nash, 1951] and correlated equilibrium [Aumann, 1974].
(See Kreps [1990] for an excellent account of the strengths and weaknesses
of these notions.) An alternate approach, called learning in games, is con-
cerned with justifying equilibrium behavior via a dynamic process where
the players learn from the past play and observations from the environment
and adapt accordingly [Aumann et al., 1995, Fudenberg and Levine, 1998,
Young, 2004]. In this paper, we will be concerned with this alternate ap-
proach.
Since decision makers are an integral part of any social system, their be-
havioral properties form an important aspect in modeling games. The study
of game theory so far has been mainly based on the assumption that the be-
havior of the players towards their lottery preferences (see Section 2 for the
definition of a lottery) can be modeled by Von Neumann and Morgenstern
[1945] expected utility theory (EUT). EUT has a nice normative appeal to it,
in particular when it comes to the independence axiom, which basically says
that if lottery L1 is preferred over lottery L2, and L is some other lottery,
then, for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the combined lottery αL1 + (1 − α)L is preferred over
the combined lottery αL2+(1−α)L. Even though this seems very intuitive, a
systematic deviation from such behavior has been observed in multiple em-
pirical studies (for example, the Allais [1953] paradox). This gave rise to
the study of non-expected utility theory that does away with the indepen-
dence axiom. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT), as formulated by Tversky
and Kahneman [1992], is one such theory, which accommodates many of
the empirically observed behavioral features without losing much tractabil-
ity [Wakker, 2010]. It is also a generalization of the expected utility theory.
It becomes even more important to consider non-EUT behavior in the
theory of learning in games. For example, in a repeated game, Hart [2005]
argues that players tend to use simple procedures like regret minimization.
A player i is said to have no regret1 if, for each pair of her actions ai, a˜i, she
does not regret not having played action a˜i whenever she played action ai.
Such regrets can simply be computed as the difference in the average payoffs
received by the player from playing action a˜i instead of action ai, assuming
the opponents stick to their actions. While evaluating such regrets in the real
world, however, players who are modeled as evaluating lotteries according
to CPT preferences are likely to exhibit different kinds of learning behavior
than that exhibited by EUT players. The proposed model in this paper is an
1also known as the internal regret or the conditional regret.
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attempt to handle these systematic deviations in learning, anticipated from
the empirically observed behavioral features exhibited by human agents, as
captured by cumulative prospect theory. We pose the following question:
How do the predictions of the theory of learning in games change if the players
behave according to CPT?
The strategies of the players are said to be in a Nash equilibrium if no
player is tempted to deviate from her strategy provided the strategies of the
others remain unchanged. Suppose now, before the game is played, there is a
mediator who sends each player a private signal to play a certain action. Each
player may then choose her action depending on this signal. A correlated
equilibrium of the original game is obtained by taking the joint distribution
over action profiles of all the players corresponding to a Nash equilibrium of
the game with a mediator [Aumann, 1974]. Crawford [1990] studies games
where players do not adhere to the independence axiom, and defines an
analog for the Nash equilibrium. Keskin [2016] defines analogs for both the
notions of equilibrium, Nash and correlated, based on CPT. We call them CPT
Nash equilibrium and CPT correlated equilibrium respectively. In Section 2, we
give a brief review of cumulative prospect theory and Keskin’s definitions for
these equilibrium notions. In the absence of the independence axiom, many
of the linearities present in the model under EUT are lost. For example, the
set of all correlated equilibria is a convex polytope [Aumann, 1987]; however,
the set of all CPT correlated equilibria need not be convex [Keskin, 2016].
In fact, it can even be disconnected [Phade and Anantharam, 2017].
For a repeated game, Foster and Vohra [1998] describe a procedure based
on calibrated learning that guarantees the convergence of the empirical distri-
bution of action play to the set of correlated equilibria, when players behave
according to EUT. In Section 3, we formulate an analog for their procedure
when players behave according to CPT. In Example 3.1, we describe a game
for which the set of all CPT correlated equilibria is non-convex and we show
that the empirical distribution of action play does not converge to this set.
We then define an extension of the set of CPT correlated equilibria and
establish the convergence of the empirical distribution of action play to this
extended set. It turns out that this extension has a nice game theoretic in-
terpretation obtained by allowing the mediator to send any private signal
(instead of restricting her to send a signal corresponding to some action).
We formally define this setup in Section 3, and call it a mediated game. My-
erson [1986] has considered a further generalization in which each player
first reports her type from a finite set Ti. The mediator collects the reports
from all the players and then sends each one of them a private signal from a
finite set Bi. The mediator is characterized by a rule ψ :
∏
i Ti → ∆(
∏
iBi)
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that maps each type profile to a probability distribution on the set of signal
profiles from which it samples the private signals to be sent. Based on her
received signal, each player chooses her action. These are called games with
communication. Let the type sets (Ti)ni=1, the signal sets (Bi)
n
i=1, and the
mediator rule ψ together comprise a communication system. Under EUT, the
set of all correlated equilibria of a game is characterized as the union over
all possible communication systems, of the sets of joint distributions on the
action profiles of all players, arising from all the Nash equilibria for the game
with communication (for a detailed exposition see [Myerson, 2013]). This
is sometimes referred to as the Bayes-Nash revelation principle or simply the
revelation principle. Since mediated games are a specific type of games with
communication, where players do not report their type, our analysis shows
that the revelation principle does not hold under CPT.
Calibrated learning is one way of studying learning in games. Some other
approaches originate from Blackwell’s approachability theory and the regret-
based framework of online learning (Hart and Mas-Colell [2000], Fudenberg
and Levine [1995]). In fact, Foster and Vohra [1998] establish the exis-
tence of calibrated learning schemes using such a regret-based framework
and Blackwell’s approachability theory. See Perchet [2009] for a compari-
son between these approaches, and see also Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [2006].
Hannan [1957] introduced the concept of no-regret strategies in the context
of repeated matrix games. No-regret learning in games is equivalent to the
convergence of the empirical distribution of action play to the set of corre-
lated equilibria [Hart and Mas-Colell, 2000, Fudenberg and Levine, 1995].
We establish an analog of this result when players behave according to CPT.
We then ask if no-regret learning is possible under CPT.
Blackwell’s approachability theorem prescribes a strategy to steer the av-
erage payoff vector of a player towards a given target set, irrespective of the
strategies of the other players. The theorem also gives a necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the existence of such a strategy provided the target set
is convex and the game environment remains fixed. Here, by game environ-
ment, we mean the rule by which the payoff vectors depend on the players’
actions. Under EUT, Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] take these payoff vectors
to be the regrets associated to a player and establish no-regret learning by
showing that the negative orthant in the space of payoff vectors is approach-
able. Under CPT, although the target set is convex, the environment is not
fixed. It depends on the empirical distribution of play at each step. A simi-
lar problem with dynamically evolving environment is considered in Kalathil
et al. [2017], where they get around this problem by considering a Stackel-
berg setting; one player (leader) plays an action first, then, after observing
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this action, the other player (follower) plays her action. In the absence of
a Stackelberg setting, as is in our case, we do not know of any result that
characterizes approachability under dynamic environments. However, as far
as games with CPT preferences are concerned, we answer this question by
giving an example of a game for which a no-regret learning strategy does not
exist (Example 4.2).
2 Preliminaries
Wedenote a finite n-person normal form game byΓ := ([n], (Ai)i∈[n], (xi)i∈[n]),
where [n] := {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Ai is the finite action set of
player i, and xi : A1 × · · · × An → R is the payoff function for player i.
Let A :=
∏
i∈[n]Ai denote the set of all action profiles a := (ai)i∈[n], where
ai ∈ Ai. Let A−i :=
∏
j∈[n]\iAj denote the set of all action profiles a−i ∈ A−i
of all players except player i. Let xi(a) denote the payoff to player i when ac-
tion profile a is played, and let xi(a˜i, a−i) denote the payoff to player i when
she chooses action a˜i ∈ Ai while the others stick to a−i. For any finite set S,
let ∆(S) denote the standard simplex of all probability distributions on the
set S, i.e.,
∆(S) := {(p(s), s ∈ S) |p(s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ S,
∑
s∈S
p(s) = 1},
with the usual topology. Let es denote the vector in ∆(S) with its s-th compo-
nent equal to 1 and the rest 0. Let ∆∗(A) denote the set of all joint probability
distributions that are of product form, i.e.,
∆∗(A) := {µ ∈ ∆(A) : µ(a) = µ1(a1)× · · · × µn(an), ∀ a ∈ A},
where µi(ai) denotes the marginal probability distribution on ai induced by
µ. Thus for a joint distribution µ ∈ ∆(A), we have
µi(ai) =
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ(ai, a−i),
and, for ai such that µi(ai) > 0, let
µ−i(a−i|ai) := µ(ai, a−i)
µi(ai)
be the conditional distribution on A−i.
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We now describe the setup for cumulative prospect theory (CPT) (for
more details see [Wakker, 2010]). Each person is associated with a reference
point r ∈ R, a corresponding value function vr : R → R, and two probability
weighting functions w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1], w+ for gains and w− for losses. The
function vr(x) satisfies: (i) it is continuous in x; (ii) vr(r) = 0; (iii) it is
strictly increasing in x. The value function is generally assumed to be convex
in the losses frame (x < r) and concave in the gains frame (x ≥ r), and
to be steeper in the losses frame than in the gains frame in the sense that
vr(r)−vr(r−z) ≥ vr(r+z)−vr(r) for all z ≥ 0. However, these assumptions
are not needed for the results in this paper to hold. The probability weighting
functions w± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] satisfy: (i) they are continuous; (ii) they are
strictly increasing; (iii) w±(0) = 0 and w±(1) = 1.
Suppose a person faces a lottery (or prospect) L := {(pj , zj)}1≤j≤t, where
zj ∈ R, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, denotes an outcome and pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t, is the probability
with which outcome zj occurs. We assume the lottery to be exhaustive, i.e.∑t
j=1 pj = 1. (Note that we are allowed to have pj = 0 for some values of
j and zk = zl even when k 6= l.) Let z := (zj)1≤j≤t and p := (pj)1≤j≤t. We
denote L as (p, z) and refer to the vector z as an outcome profile.
Let α := (α1, . . . , αt) be a permutation of (1, . . . , t) such that
zα1 ≥ zα2 ≥ · · · ≥ zαt . (2.1)
Let 0 ≤ jr ≤ t be such that zαj ≥ r for 1 ≤ j ≤ jr and zαj < r for jr < j ≤ t.
(Here jr = 0 when zαj < r for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t.) The CPT value V (L) of the
prospect L is evaluated using the value function vr(·) and the probability
weighting functions w±(·) as follows:
V (L) :=
jr∑
j=1
pi+j (p, α)v
r(zαj ) +
t∑
j=jr+1
pi−j (p, α)v
r(zαj ), (2.2)
where pi+j (p, α), 1 ≤ j ≤ jr, pi−j (p, α), jr < j ≤ t, are decision weights defined
via:
pi+1 (p, α) := w
+(pα1),
pi+j (p, α) := w
+(pα1 + · · ·+ pαj )− w+(pα1 + · · ·+ pαj−1) for 1 < j ≤ t,
pi−j (p, α) := w
−(pαt + · · ·+ pαj )− w−(pαt + · · ·+ pαj+1) for 1 ≤ j < t,
pi−t (p, α) := w
−(pαt).
Although the expression on the right in equation (2.2) depends on the per-
mutation α, one can check that the formula evaluates to the same value V (L)
as long as the permutation α satisfies (2.1).
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A person is said to have CPT preferences if, given a choice between prospect
L1 and prospect L2, she chooses the one with higher CPT value.
We now describe the notion of correlated equilibrium incorporating CPT
preferences, as defined by Keskin [2016]. For each player i, let ri, v
ri
i (·)
and w±i (·) be the reference point, the value function, and the probability
weighting functions respectively, that player i uses to evaluate the CPT value
Vi(L) of a lottery L.
Suppose there is a mediator characterized by a joint distribution µ ∈
∆(A) who draws an action profile a = (ai)i∈[n] according to the distribution
µ and sends signal ai to each player i. Player i is signaled only her action ai
and not the entire action profile a = (ai)i∈[n]. We assume that all the players
know the distribution µ. If player i observes a signal to play ai, and if she
decides to deviate to a strategy a˜i ∈ Ai, then she will face the lottery
Li(µ−i(a−i|ai), a˜i) := {(µ−i(a−i|ai), xi(a˜i, a−i))}a−i∈A−i .
Definition 2.1 (Keskin [2016]). A joint probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(S)
is said to be a CPT correlated equilibrium of Γ if it satisfies the following
inequalities for all i and for all ai, a˜i ∈ Ai such that µi(ai) > 0:
Vi(Li(µ−i(a−i|ai), ai)) ≥ Vi(Li(µ−i(a−i|ai), a˜i)). (2.3)
We denote the set of all the CPT correlated equilibria of a game Γ byC(Γ).
Note that C(Γ) also depends on the reference points, the value functions and
the probability weighting functions of all the players. However we suppress
this dependence from the notation.
We now describe the notion of CPT Nash equilibrium as defined by Keskin
[2016]2. For a mixed strategy µ ∈ ∆∗(A), if each player j decides to play aj ,
drawn from the distribution µj , then player i will face the lottery
Li(µ−i, ai) := {(µ−i(a−i), xi(ai, a−i))}a−i∈A−i ,
where µ−i(a−i) :=
∏
j 6=i µj(aj) plays the role of µ−i(a−i|ai), which does not
depend on ai. Suppose player i decides to deviate and play a mixed strategy
µ˜i while the rest of the players continue to play µ−i. Then define the average
CPT value for player i by
Ai(µ˜i, µ−i) :=
∑
ai∈Ai
µ˜i(ai)Vi(Li(µ−i, ai)).
2Keskin defines CPT equilibrium assuming w+(·) = w−(·). However, the definition can
be easily extended to our general setting and the proof of existence goes through without
difficulty.
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The best response set of player i to a mixed strategy µ ∈ ∆∗(A) is defined as
BRi(µ) := {µ∗i ∈ ∆(Ai)|∀µ˜i ∈ ∆(Ai),Ai(µ∗i , µ−i) ≥ Ai(µ˜i, µ−i)} .
Definition 2.2 (Keskin [2016]). A mixed strategy µ∗ ∈ ∆∗(A), is a CPT Nash
equilibrium iff
µ∗i ∈ BRi(µ∗) for all i.
Keskin [2016] shows that for every game Γ, there exists a CPT Nash equi-
librium. Further, he also shows that the set of all CPT Nash equilibria of a
game Γ is equal to C(Γ) ∩∆∗(A). Thus, as a consequence, we have that the
set C(Γ) is nonempty. A strategy µ ∈ ∆∗(A) is called a pure strategy if the
support of µi is singleton for each i. We call µ∗ a pure CPT Nash equilibrium
if µ∗ is a pure strategy. Note that every pure CPT Nash equilibrium is a pure
Nash equilibrium for the EUT game where each player i computes its value
in the action profile (ai)i∈[n] as v
ri
i (xi(ai, a−i)).
3 Calibrated learning in games
Let Γ be a finite n-person game which is played repeatedly at each step (or
round), t ≥ 1. The game Γ is called the one shot game (or the stage game)
of the repeated game. At every step t, each player i draws an action ati ∈ Ai
from a distribution σti ∈ ∆(Ai). We assume that the randomizations of the
players are independent of each other and of the past randomizations. For
example, if each player i uses a uniform random variableU ti to draw a sample
from σti , then the random variables {U ti }i∈[n],t≥1 are independent. We assume
that after playing her action ati, each player observes the actions taken by all
the other players and thus at any step t all the players have access to the
history of the play Ht−1 := (a1, . . . , at−1), where at := (ati)i∈[n] is the action
profile played at step t. We also assume that each player knows the one step
game Γ. Let the strategy for player i for the repeated game above be given
by Si := (σti , t ≥ 1), where σti : Ht−1 → ∆(Ai), for each t.
We first describe the result of Foster and Vohra [1997]. Suppose the
players follow the following natural strategy: At every step t, on the basis
of the past history of play, Ht−1, each player i predicts a joint distribution
µt−i ∈ ∆(A−i) on the action profile of all the other players. This is player
i’s assessment of how her opponents might play in the next step. Depending
on this assessment, player i chooses a specific action among those that are
most preferred by her, called her best reaction.3 Foster and Vohra [1997]
3Foster and Vohra [1997] refer to it as the best response. In order to avoid confusion with
the best response set defined in section 2, we prefer to use the term best reaction.
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prove that (i) if each player’s assessments are calibrated with respect to the
sequence of action profiles of the other players and (ii) if each player plays
the best reaction to her assessments, then the limit points of the empirical
distribution of action play are correlated equilibria. By action play we mean
the sequence of action profiles played by the players. We will give a formal
definition of what is meant by calibration shortly. For the moment, roughly,
calibration says that the empirical distributions conditioned on assessments
converge to the assessments. The best reaction of player i to her assessment
µ−i of the actions of the other players, as considered by Foster and Vohra
[1997], is a specific action a∗i ∈ Ai that maximizes the expected payoff to
player i with respect to her assessment. i.e.,
a∗i ∈ arg max
ai∈Ai
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ−i(a−i)xi(ai, a−i).
Thus the best reaction is an action in the best response set. Note that it is
assumed that each player uses a fixed tie breaking rule if there is more than
one action in the best response set.
Suppose now that the players behave according to CPT. Given player i’s
assessment µ−i of the play of her opponents, she is faced with the following
set of lotteries, one for each of her actions ai ∈ Ai:
Li(µ−i, ai) = {µ−i(a−i), xi (ai, a−i)}a−i∈A−i .
Out of these lotteries, the ones she prefers most are those with the maximum
CPT value Vi (Li (µ−i, ai)), evaluated using her reference point ri, value func-
tion vrii , and her probability weighting functionsw
±
i . The choice of the action
she takes corresponding to her most preferred lottery (with any arbitrary but
fixed tie breaking rule) will be called her best reaction. Thus the best reaction
is a specific action in the best response set.
We now ask the following question: Suppose each player’s assessments are
calibrated with respect to the sequence of action profiles of the other players and
she evaluates her best reaction in accordance with CPT preferences as explained
above, then are the limit points of the empirical distribution of play contained
in the set of CPT correlated equilibria? Unfortunately, the answer is no (Ex-
ample 3.1). Before seeing why, let us give the promised formal definition of
the notion of calibration.
Consider a sequence of outcomes y1, y2, . . . generated by Nature, belong-
ing to some finite set S. At each step t, the forecaster predicts a distribution
qt ∈ ∆(S). Let N(q, t) denote the number of times the distribution q is fore-
cast up to step t, i.e. N(q, t) :=
∑t
τ=1 1{qτ = q}, where 1{·} is the indicator
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I II III IV
0 2β, 1 β + 1, 1 0, 1 1, 1
1 1.99, 0 1.99, 0 1.99, 0 1.99, 0
Table 1: Payoffmatrix for the game Γ∗ in example 3.1. The rows and columns
correspond to player 1 and 2’s actions respectively. The first entry in each cell
corresponds to player 1’s payoff and second to player 2’s payoff.
function that takes value 1 if the expression inside {·} holds and 0 otherwise.
Let ρ(q, y, t) be the fraction of the steps on which the forecaster predicts q for
which Nature plays y ∈ S, i.e.,
ρ(q, y, t) :=

0 if N(q, t) = 0
t∑
τ=1
1{qτ=q}1{yτ=y}
N(q,t) otherwise.
The forecast is said to be calibrated with respect to the sequence of plays
made by Nature if:
lim
t→∞
∑
q∈Qt
|ρ(q, y, t)− q(y)|N(q, t)
t
= 0 for all y ∈ S,
where the sum is over the setQt of all distributions predicted by the forecaster
up to step t.
Example 3.1. We consider a modification of the 2-player game proposed by
Keskin [2016], where it is used to demonstrate that the set of CPT correlated
equilibria can be nonconvex. Let the 2-player game Γ∗ be represented by
the matrix in table 1, where β = 1/w+1 (0.5). For the probability weighting
functions w±i (·), we employ the functions of the form suggested by Prelec
[1998], which, for i = 1, 2, are given by
w±i (p) = exp{−(− ln p)γi},
where γ1 = 0.5 and γ2 = 1. We thus have w+1 (0.5) = 0.435 and β = 2.299.
Let the reference points be r1 = r2 = 0. Let v
ri
i (·) be the identity function
for i = 1, 2. Notice that player 2 is indifferent amongst her actions.
Let µodd := (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0) and µeven := (0, 0.5, 0, 0.5) be distributions on
player 2’s actions. We can evaluate the CPT values of player 1 for the follow-
ing lotteries:
V1(L1(µodd,0)) = 2βw+1 (0.5) = 2, V1(L1(µodd,1)) = 1.99,
V1(L1(µeven,0)) = 1 + βw+1 (0.5) = 2, V1(L1(µeven,1)) = 1.99.
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I II III IV
0 0.5 0 0.5 0
1 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Empirical distribution µo for the action play in example 3.1.
I II III IV
0 0 0.5 0 0.5
1 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Empirical distribution µe for the action play in example 3.1.
Thus, player 1’s best reaction to both these distributions µodd and µeven is ac-
tion 0. Since, player 2 is indifferent amongst her actions, we get that the dis-
tributions µo and µe represented in tables 2 and 3 respectively, belong to the
set C(Γ∗). The mean of these two distributions is given by µ∗ as represented
in Table 4. Let µunif := (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25) be the uniform distribution
on player 2’s actions. We have, the CPT values of player 1 for the following
lotteries:
V1(L1(µunif ,0)) = w+1 (0.75) + βw
+
1 (0.5) + (β − 1)w+1 (0.25) = 1.985,
V1(L1(µunif , 1)) = 1.99.
Thus, player 1’s best reaction to distribution µunif is action 1. This shows that
µ∗ /∈ C(Γ∗), and hence C(Γ∗) is not convex. Using this fact, we will construct
a sequence of calibrated assessments and their corresponding best reactions
for each player, such that the limit of the generated empirical distribution of
action play does not belong to C(Γ∗).
Suppose player 2 plays her actions in a cyclic manner starting with ac-
tion I at step 1, followed by II, III, IV and then again I and so on. Sup-
pose player 1’s assessment of player 2’s action is µodd = (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0) and
µeven = (0, 0.5, 0, 0.5) at each odd and even step respectively. Then it is easy
to see that player 1’s assessments are calibrated. (Here player 2 plays the role
of Nature from the point of view of player 1.) Since player 1’s best reaction
is action 0 to all her assessments, she would play action 0 throughout. The
distribution µ∗ is a limit point of the empirical distribution of action play and
does not belong to C(Γ∗).
We have not described player 2’s assessments. We would like to show
that player 2’s assessments are calibrated and her best reactions lead to the
cyclic play exhibited. However, to do so we need to modify the game into a
11
I II III IV
0 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
1 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Empirical distribution µ∗ for the action play in example 3.1.
3-person game. Let player 1 have two actions {0,1}, and players 2 and 3 both
have four actions {I,II,III,IV} each. Let the payoffs to all the three players be
−1 if players 2 and 3 play different actions. If players 2 and 3 play the same
action, then let the resulting payoffmatrix be as represented in table 1, where
the rows correspond to player 1’s actions and the columns correspond to the
common actions of players 2 and 3. Player 1 receives the payoff represented
by the first entry in each cell and player 2 and 3 each receive the payoff rep-
resented by the second entry. Let player 1’s CPT behaviour be characterized
by the reference point, value function and probability weighting functions as
in the 2-person game. For players 2 and 3, let them be as for player 2 in that
game. Let player 2 and 3 play in the cyclic manner as above, in sync with
each other. Let player 1 play action 0 throughout. Let player 2’s assessment
at step t be the point distribution supported by the action profile at−2 which
equals 0 for player 1 and the action played by player 2 for player 3. Similarly,
let player 3’s assessment at step t be the point distribution supported by the
action profile at−3 which equals 0 for player 1 and the action played by player
3 for player 2. These assessments are clearly calibrated. Here the action pair
comprised of the actions of players 1 and 3 play the role of the actions of
Nature from the point of view of player 2, and similarly the action pair com-
prised of the actions of players 1 and 2 play the role of the actions of Nature
from the point of view of player 3. The actions of player 2 and 3 at every step
are best reactions to their corresponding assessments. Let the assessment of
player 1 be µodd and µeven at odd and even steps where now the distribution
µodd puts 0.5 probability on action profiles (I,I) and (III,III), and µeven puts 0.5
probability on action profiles (II,II) and (IV,IV). Again player 1’s assessments
are calibrated (where now action pairs comprised of the actions of player 2
and player 3 play the role of the actions of Nature from the point of view
of player 1) and her actions are best reactions to her assessments. The limit
point of the empirical distribution of action play is the distribution that puts
probability 0.25 on action profiles (0,I,I), (0,II,II), (0,III,III) and (0,IV,IV).
Since action 0 is not a best response of player 1 to the distribution σunif that
puts probability 0.25 on action profiles (I,I), (II,II), (III,III) and (IV,IV), the
limit point of the empirical distribution is not a CPT correlated equilibrium.
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Thus, we have a game where the assessments of each player are calibrated
and each player plays her best reaction, but the limit empirical distribution
of action play exists and is not a CPT correlated equilibrium.
Mediated Games
In example 3.1, the fact that action 0 is player 1’s best reaction to the distri-
butions µodd and µeven, but not to µunif , plays an essential role in showing
both the non-convexity of the set C(Γ∗) and the non-convergence of cali-
brated learning to the set C(Γ∗). We now describe a convex extension of the
set C(Γ) and establish the convergence of the empirical distribution of action
play to this extended set. It turns out that this extended set of equilibria
also has a game theoretic interpretation, as follows. Suppose we add a signal
system (Bi)i∈[n] to a game Γ, where each Bi is a finite set. Suppose there
is a mediator who sends a signal bi ∈ Bi to player i. Let B = Πi∈[n]Bi be
the set of all signal profiles b = (bi)i∈[n] and B−i = Πj 6=iBj denote the set of
signal profiles b−i of all players except player i. Let Γ˜ := (Γ, (Bi)i∈[n]) denote
such a game with signal system. We call it a mediated game. The mediator
is characterized by a distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B) that we call the mediator dis-
tribution. Thus, the mediator draws a signal profile b = (bi)i∈[n] from the
mediator distribution ψ and sends signal bi to player i. In the definition of a
correlated equilibrium the set Bi is restricted to be the set of actions Ai for
each player i.
A randomized strategy for any player i is given by a function σi : Bi →
∆(Ai) and a randomized strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) gives the random-
ized strategy for all players. We define the best response set of player i to a
randomized strategy profile σ and a mediator distribution ψ as
BRi(ψ, σ) :=
{
σ∗i : Bi → ∆(Ai)
∣∣∣∣ for all bi ∈ Bi,
supp(σ∗i (bi)) ⊂ arg max
ai∈Ai
Vi
(
{µ˜−i(a−i|bi), xi(ai, a−i)}a−i∈A−i
)}
,
(3.1)
where
µ˜−i(a−i|bi) :=
∑
b−i∈B−i
ψ−i(b−i|bi)
∏
j∈[n]\i
σj(bj)(aj), (3.2)
and supp(·) denotes the support of the distribution within the brackets.
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Definition 3.2. A randomized strategy profile σ is said to be a mediated CPT
Nash equilibrium of a game Γ˜ with respect to a mediator distribution ψ ∈
∆(B) iff
σi ∈ BRi(ψ, σ) for all i ∈ [n].
Let Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ) denote the set of all mediated CPT Nash equilibria of
Γ˜ = (Γ, (Bi)i∈[n]) with respect to a mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B).
For any mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B), and any randomized strategy
profile σ, let η(ψ, σ) ∈ ∆(A) be given by
η(ψ, σ)(a) :=
∑
b∈B
ψ(b)
∏
i∈[n]
σi(bi)(ai). (3.3)
Thus, η(ψ, σ) gives the joint distribution over action profiles of all players
corresponding to the randomized strategy σ and the mediator distribution
ψ.
Definition 3.3. A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is said to be a mediated
CPT correlated equilibrium of a game Γ iff there exist a signal system (Bi)i∈[n],
a mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B) and a mediated CPT Nash equilibrium
σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ) such that µ = η(ψ, σ).
If all the players choose to ignore the signals sent by the mediator, then
the corresponding randomized strategy profile σ consists of constant func-
tions σi(bi) ≡ µ∗i . Further, it follows from Definitions 3.2 and 2.2 that the
mixed strategy µ∗ =
∏
i∈[n] µ
∗
i is a CPT Nash equilibrium of the game Γ iff σ
is a mediated CPT Nash equilibrium of the game Γ˜ with mediator distribu-
tion ψ for any mediator distribution ψ. Since every game Γ has at least one
CPT Nash equilibrium, we have that every mediated game Γ˜ with mediator
distribution ψ has at least one mediated CPT Nash equilibrium with respect
to the mediator distribution ψ.
Let D(Γ) denote the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria of a
game Γ. By definition, D(Γ) is the union over all signal systems (Bi)i∈[n]
and mediator distributions ψ ∈ ∆(B) of {η(ψ, σ) : σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ)}
When Bi = Ai for all i ∈ [n] and σi(bi)(ai) = 1{bi = ai}, one can check
that σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Ai)i∈[n], ψ) if and only if ψ ∈ C(Γ). In this case η(ψ, σ) = ψ
and so we have C(Γ) ⊂ D(Γ). Under EUT, Aumann [1987] proves that
D(Γ) = C(Γ). However, under CPT, this property, in general, does not hold
true. Lemma 3.4 shows how D(Γ) compares with C(Γ).
For any i, ai, a˜i ∈ Ai, let C(Γ, i, ai, a˜i) denote the set of all probability
vectors pi−i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that
Vi(Li(pi−i, ai)) ≥ Vi(Li(pi−i, a˜i)). (3.4)
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It is clear from the definition of CPT correlated equilibrium that, for a joint
probability distribution µ ∈ C(Γ), provided µi(ai) > 0, the probability vector
pi−i(·) = µ−i(·|ai) ∈ ∆(A−i) should belong to C(Γ, i, ai, a˜i) for all a˜i ∈ Ai.
Let
C(Γ, i, ai) := ∩a˜i∈AiC(Γ, i, ai, a˜i).
Now, for all i, define a subset C(Γ, i) ⊂ ∆(A), as follows:
C(Γ, i) := {µ ∈ ∆(A)|µ−i(·|ai) ∈ C(Γ, i, ai), ∀ai ∈ supp (µi)}.
Note that, since Vi(Li(pi−i, ai)) is a continuous function of pi−i, the setsC(Γ, i, ai, a˜i),
C(Γ, i, ai) and C(Γ, i) are all closed.
Lemma 3.4. For any game Γ, we have
(i) For all i ∈ [n], co (C(Γ, i)) = {µ ∈ ∆(A)|µ−i(·|ai) ∈ co (C(Γ, i, ai)) , ∀ai ∈
supp (µi)},
(ii) C(Γ) = ∩i∈[n]C(Γ, i), and
(iii) D(Γ) = ∩i∈[n]co(C(Γ, i)).
where co(S) denotes the convex hull of a set S.
Proof. Fix i ∈ [n]. Note that, since the sets C(Γ, i) and C(Γ, i, ai) for each
ai ∈ Ai are closed, the convex hulls of these sets are closed. Suppose µ =
λµ1 + (1−λ)µ2 where µ1, µ2 ∈ C(Γ, i) and 0 < λ < 1. If ai ∈ supp(µi), then
one of the following three cases holds:
Case 1 [ai ∈ supp(µ1i ), ai ∈ supp(µ2i )]. Then, µ1−i(·|ai), µ2−i(·|ai) ∈
C(Γ, i, ai) and we have,
µ−i(·|ai) =
λµ1i (ai)µ
1
−i(·|ai) + (1− λ)µ2i (ai)µ2−i(·|ai)
λµ1i (ai) + (1− λ)µ2i (ai)
.
Let θ = (λµ1i (ai))/(λµ
1
i (ai) + (1 − λ)µ2i (ai)). Then µ−i(·|ai) = θµ1−i(·|ai) +
(1− θ)µ2−i(·|ai) and hence µ−i(·|ai) ∈ co (C(Γ, i, ai)).
Case 2 [ai ∈ supp(µ1i ), ai /∈ supp(µ2i )] Here µ−i(·|ai) = µ1−i(·|a1). Hence
µ−i(·|ai) ∈ C(Γ, i, ai).
Case 3 [ai /∈ supp(µ1i ), ai ∈ supp(µ2i )] This can be handled similarly to
case 2.
Also, the above argument can be easily extended to when µ is a convex
combination of any finite number of distributions. Since all our sets are com-
pact subsets of finite dimensional Euclidean spaces, Caratheodory’s theorem
applies, and hence we need to consider only finite convex combinations.
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This shows that the set on the LHS is contained in the set on the RHS of
the equation in (i) for the given fixed i ∈ [n].
To prove the other inclusion, let µ belong to the set on the RHS of the
equation in (i). Fix i ∈ [n]. If ai ∈ supp(µi), then µ−i(·|ai) is a linear combi-
nation of |A−i| joint distributions (allowing repetitions)
ζ1−i,ai , . . . , ζ
mi
−i,ai , . . . , ζ
|A−i|
−i,ai ∈ C(Γ, i, ai)
with coefficients θmii,ai , 1 ≤ mi ≤ |A−i| respectively. For each ζmi−i,ai , construct
a distribution µmii,ai ∈ ∆(A) by µmii,ai(a˜i, a˜−i) = 1{a˜i = ai}ζmi−i,ai(a˜−i). Then
µmii,ai ∈ C(Γ, i). Let λmii,ai := µi(ai)θmii,ai , for all i,mi, ai such that µi(ai) > 0.
One can now check that µ =
∑
mi,ai
λmii,aiµ
mi
i,ai
for the given fixed i ∈ [n]. Thus
µ ∈ co (C(Γ, i)).
Statement (ii) follows directly from the definition of CPT correlated equi-
librium.
For statement (iii), let µ ∈ ∆(A) be such that µ ∈ co(C(Γ, i)) for all i.
By (i), we have, µ−i(·|ai) ∈ co (C(Γ, i, ai)) for all ai such that µi(ai) > 0.
As above, let µ−i(·|ai) be a convex combination of |A−i| joint distributions
(allowing repetitions)
ζ1−i,ai , . . . , ζ
mi
−i,ai , . . . , ζ
|A−i|
−i,ai ∈ C(Γ, i, ai)
with coefficients θmii,ai , 1 ≤ mi ≤ |A−i| respectively. For all i, letBi := Ai×Mi,
whereMi := {1, . . . , |A−i|}. Let the mediator distribution be given by
ψ ((a1,m1), . . . , (an,mn)) =

µ(a)
∏n
i=1
{
θ
mi
i,ai
ζ
mi
−i,ai (a−i)
}
∑
m˜i,i∈[n]
n∏
i=1
{
θ
m˜i
i,ai
ζ
m˜i
−i,ai (a−i)
} if µ(a) > 0,
0 otherwise.
(3.5)
It is useful to note that∑
m˜i,i∈[n]
n∏
i=1
{
θm˜ii,aiζ
m˜i
−i,ai(a−i)
}
=
n∏
i=1
µ−i(a−i|ai), (3.6)
and that, for every i ∈ [n],
ψi((ai,mi)) :=
∑
(aj ,mj),j∈[n]\i
ψ ((a1,m1), . . . , (an,mn)) = µi(ai)θ
mi
i,ai
. (3.7)
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Let the strategy for each player i be
σi(ai,mi)(a˜i) =
{
1 if a˜i = ai,
0 otherwise.
(3.8)
From equations (3.3), (3.5) and (3.8) we have
η(ψ, σ)(a) =
∑
(a˜i,mi)∈Bi,i∈[n]
ψ ((a˜1,m1), . . . , (a˜n,mn))
∏
i∈[n]
σi ((a˜i,mi)) (ai)
=
∑
mi,i∈[n]
ψ ((a1,m1), . . . , (an,mn))
= µ(a)×
∑
mi,i∈[n]
n∏
i=1
{
θmii,aiζ
mi
−i,ai(a−i)
}
∑
m˜i,i∈[n]
n∏
i=1
{
θm˜ii,aiζ
m˜i
−i,ai(a−i)
}
= µ(a).
From equations (3.2), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7) and (3.8) we have
µ˜−i(a−i|(ai,mi)) =
∑
(a˜j ,mj)∈Bj ,j∈[n]\i
ψ−i(((a˜j ,mj), j ∈ [n]\i) |(ai,mi))
∏
j∈[n]\i
σj((a˜j ,mj))(aj)
=
∑
mj ,j∈[n]\i
ψ−i(((aj ,mj), j ∈ [n]\i) |(ai,mi))
=
∑
mj ,j∈[n]\i ψ ((a1,m1), . . . , (an,mn))
ψi((ai,mi))
= ζmi−i,ai(a−i).
Thus we have µ˜−i(·|(ai,mi)) ∈ C(Γ, i, ai). Hence µ ∈ D(Γ). We have estab-
lished that ∩i∈Nco(C(Γ, i)) ⊂ D(Γ).
For the other direction of statement (iii), let µ ∈ D(Γ). Then there exists
a signal system (Bi)i∈[n], a mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B), and a mediated
CPT Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ) such that µ = η(ψ, σ). Fix i ∈
[n]. For ai ∈ supp (σi(bi)), we have µ˜−i(a−i|bi) ∈ C(Γ, i, ai), from equations
(3.1) and (3.4). But
µ−i(·|ai) =
∑
bi
ψi(bi)σi(bi)(ai)
µi(ai)
µ−i(·|bi).
Hence µ−i(·|ai) ∈ co (C(Γ, i, ai)). Since this holds for all i ∈ [n], we have
µ = η(ψ, σ) ∈ ∩i∈[n]co(C(Γ, i)). This completes the proof.
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For the 2-person game Γ∗ in example 3.1, we observed that the set C(Γ∗)
is non-convex and henceC(Γ∗) 6= D(Γ∗). If Γ is a 2×2 game, i.e., a gamewith
2 players, each having two actions, and both behaving according to CPT, then
Phade and Anantharam [2017] prove that the sets C(Γ, i), corresponding to
both these players are convex, and hence also the setC(Γ). From Lemma 3.4,
we have the following result, having the flavor of the revelation principle:
Proposition 3.5. IfΓ is a 2×2 game, then the set of all CPT correlated equilibria
is equal to the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria.
In the context of mediated games, a strategy σi for player i is said to be
pure if supp (σi) is singleton and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈[n] is said to be
a pure strategy profile if each σi is a pure strategy.
Remark 3.6. From the proof of Lemma 3.4, we observe that for any µ ∈ D(Γ),
there exists a signal system (Bi)i∈[n], a mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B), and
amediated CPTNash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ) such that µ = η(ψ, σ)
where σ is a pure strategy profile.
Remark 3.7. Nau et al. [2004] showed that for any n-person game, the Nash
equilibria all lie on the boundary of the set of correlated equilibria. Phade
and Anantharam [2017] extend this result to the CPT setting and show that
all the CPT Nash equilibria lie on the boundary of the set of CPT correlated
equilibria. It is natural to ask whether the CPT Nash equilibria, in fact, lie
on the boundary of the set of all mediated CPT correlated equilibria. We
know this is true for any 2 × 2 game Γ, since C(Γ) = D(Γ) for such games.
However, it is not known if this property holds in general for any game, and
we leave this for future work.
Calibrated learning to mediated CPT correlated equilibrium
Let ξt denote the empirical joint distribution of the action play up to step t.
Formally,
ξt =
1
t
t∑
τ=1
eaτ ,
where eat is an |A|-dimensional vector with its at-th component equal to 1
and the rest 0. We write the coordinates of ξt as (ξt(a), a ∈ A). For each
i ∈ [n], we write ξti := (ξti(ai), ai ∈ Ai) for the empirical distribution of the
actions of player i. Thus ξti is the i-th marginal distribution corresponding
to ξt. Similarly, for i ∈ [n], ξt−i := (ξt−i(a−i|ai), a ∈ A) are conditional dis-
tributions corresponding to ξt, where ξt−i(a−i|ai) is defined to be 0 when
18
ξt(a) = 0. Let the distance between a vector x and a set X be given by
d(x,X) = inf
x′∈X
‖x− x′‖,
where ‖x‖ denotes the standard Euclidean norm of x. We say that a sequence
(xt, t ≥ 1) converges to a set X if the following holds:
lim
t→∞ d(x
t, X) = 0.
Theorem 3.8. Assume that all the players use calibrated forecasters to predict
assessments and choose the best reaction to these assessments at every step. Then
the joint empirical distribution of action play ξt converges to the set of mediated
CPT correlated equilibria.
Proof. Consider the sequence of empirical distributions ξt. Since the simplex
∆(A) of all joint distributions over action profiles is a compact set, every
sequence has a convergent subsequence. Thus, it is enough to show that
the limit of any convergent subsequence of ξt is in D(Γ). Let ξtk be such a
convergent subsequence and denote its limit by ξˆ.
Let ai be an action of player i such that ξˆi(ai) > 0. Let Ri(ai) ⊂ ∆(A−i)
be the set of all joint distributions µ−i for which action ai is player i’s best
reaction under CPT preferences. Note that, Ri(ai) forms a partition of the
simplex ∆(A−i). Recall that µt−i ∈ ∆(A−i) denotes player i’s assessment at
step t, and let Qti denote the set of assessments made by her up to step t. We
have, for all tk such that ξ
tk
i (ai) > 0,
ξtk−i(a−i|ai)
∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
N(q, tk) =
∑
τ≤tk
s.t. µτ−i∈Ri(ai)
1{aτ−i = a−i}
=
∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
∑
τ≤tk
s.t. µτ−i=q
1{aτ−i = a−i}
=
∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
ρ(q, a−i, tk)N(q, tk)
=
∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
q(a−i)N(q, tk)
+
∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
(ρ(q, a−i, tk)− q(a−i))N(q, tk).
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Since the forecast being used by player i is calibrated, the second term in the
last expression goes to zero at k →∞. Further, we have for all k ≥ 1,∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
qN(q, tk)∑
q∈Ri(ai)∩Qtki
N(q, tk)
∈ co (Ri(ai)) .
Taking the limit as k → ∞ we have, ξˆ−i(·|ai) ∈ c¯o (Ri(ai)), where c¯o(·)
denotes the closed convex hull. Note that Ri(ai) ⊂ C(Γ, i, ai) and C(Γ, i, ai)
is closed. Thus ξˆ−i(·|ai) ∈ co (C(Γ, i, ai)) for all ai ∈ Ai such that ξˆi(ai) > 0.
By Lemma 3.4, we have ξˆ ∈ co (C(Γ, i)), and since this is true for all players
i, we have ξˆ ∈ D(Γ).
Remark 3.9. In the proof above, we, in fact, prove the following stronger
statement: If player i’s assessments are calibrated and she chooses the best
reaction to these assessments at every step, then the joint empirical distribu-
tion of action play converges to the set co (C(Γ, i)).
This establishes the convergence of the empirical distribution of action
play to the set of mediated CPT correlated equilibria under calibrated learn-
ing. Oakes [1985] proves that there does not exist a deterministic forecast-
ing scheme that is calibrated for all sequences played by Nature. As noted
in [Foster and Vohra, 1997, Theorem 3], however, there exists a random-
ized forecasting scheme such that, no matter what outcome sequence Nature
plays, the forecaster is almost surely calibrated. By a randomized forecast-
ing scheme we mean the following: At each step t, the forecaster predicts
a distribution qt ∈ ∆(S) by drawing one randomly from a distribution over
the space of distributions ∆(S), based on the history (y1, . . . , yt−1). Formally,
there exists a randomized forecasting scheme such that the forecaster’s cali-
bration score∑
q∈Qt
|ρ(q, y, t)− q(y)|N(q, t)
t
→ 0 as t→∞ almost surely,
irrespective of the outcome sequence played by the Nature4. Combining this
result with theorem 3.8 we have,
Corollary 3.10. There exist randomized calibrated forecasting schemes for
each player, such that if each player predicts her assessments according to her
4Foster and Vohra [1998] prove the existence of a randomized forecasting scheme that
makes the forecaster’s calibration score tend to zero in probability. However, as noted in Cesa-
Bianchi and Lugosi [2006], the same argument proves that the convergence of the calibration
score holds, in fact, almost surely.
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scheme, and plays the best reaction to her assessments, then the empirical dis-
tribution of action play converges almost surely to the set of mediated CPT cor-
related equilibria.
Proof. Let player i be the forecaster and let all the opponents together form
Nature from the point of view of the player. Thus Nature’s action set is
S = A−i. By the Foster and Vohra [1998] result, there exists a random-
ized forecasting scheme for player i that is calibrated. Let player i use this
randomized scheme to predict her assessments. From remark 3.9, it follows
that the empirical distribution of play converges to the set co (C(Γ, i)) al-
most surely. If each player i follows such a strategy, then we get almost sure
convergence to D(Γ).
We now show that, in a certain sense, the set D(Γ) is the smallest pos-
sible extension of the set C(Γ) that guarantees convergence of the empirical
distribution of action play to this set, when all the players have calibrated
assessments and play the best reaction to these assessments. In particular,
we claim the following:
Proposition 3.11. For all games Γ and any µ ∈ D(Γ), such that the sets
C(Γ, i, ai), i ∈ [n], ai ∈ Ai, do not have any isolated points, if µ ∈ D(Γ), then
there exists a sequence of actions (ati)t≥1 and a sequence of assessments (µ
t
−i)t≥1,
for each player i ∈ [n], such that the assessments are calibrated, the action ati is
the best reaction to the assessment µt−i, for all t ≥ 1, i ∈ [n], and the empirical
distribution of action play converges to µ.
The following proposition (proved in Appendix 3.12) shows that for “generic”
games Γ, the sets C(Γ, i, ai), i ∈ [n], ai ∈ Ai, do not have any isolated points.
Proposition 3.12. For any fixed preference features ri, vrii , w
±
i , for each of the
players i ∈ [n], and a fixed action set Ai for all of them, the set of all games
Γ, for which there exists a player i ∈ [n] and an action ai ∈ Ai such that the
set C(Γ, i, ai) has an isolated point, is a null set with respect to the Lebesgue
measure λ on the space of payoffs (xi(a), a ∈ A, i ∈ [n]), viewed as an n× |A|-
dimensional Euclidean space.
Proof of Proposition 3.11. Since µ ∈ D(Γ), as noted in Remark 3.6, there
exists a signal system (Bi)i∈[n], a mediator distribution ψ ∈ ∆(B), and a me-
diated CPT Nash equilibrium σ ∈ Σ(Γ, (Bi)i∈[n], ψ) such that µ = η(ψ, σ),
where σ is a pure strategy profile. With abuse of notation, let σi(bi) denote
the unique element in the support of σi(bi). Let (b1, b2, . . . ) be a sequence
of signal profiles such that the empirical distribution of these signal profiles
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converges to ψ. At step t, let player i predict her assessment µ˜−i(·|bi) (as
defined in Equation (3.2)) and play σi(bi). The assessments of all players
are calibrated. To see this, fix a player i, and let q ∈ ∆(A−i) be one of the
assessments made by her, and let G = {bi ∈ Bi|µ˜−i(·|bi) = q}. Let tk(bi)
denote the step when player i receives signal bi for the kth time. By con-
struction, the empirical average of the action profiles of opponents over steps
(tk(bi))k≥1 converges to µ˜−i(·|bi). As a result, the empirical average of the
action profiles of opponents over steps when player i receives a signal bi ∈ G,
converges to q. Since this holds for any assessment qmade by player i, her as-
sessments are calibrated. Further, by construction the empirical distribution
of play converges to µ.
If µ˜−i(·|bi) = µ˜−i(·|b˜i) implies σi(bi) = σi(b˜i), for all bi, b˜i ∈ Bi, i ∈ [n],
then we can define σi(bi) as the best reaction to the assessment µ˜−i(·|bi) and
the claim is proved. Suppose there exist bi, b˜i such that µ˜−i(·|bi) = µ˜−i(·|b˜i)
but σi(bi) 6= σi(b˜i), then there is a problem in defining the best reaction to
the assessment µ˜−i(·|bi). In Appendix A, we describe a way to get around
such a situation and this completes the proof.
4 No-regret learning and CPT correlated equilibrium
The randomized forecasting scheme proposed in Foster and Vohra [1998]
generates a probability distribution on the space of assessments of player
i. Player i draws her assessment from this distribution and then plays her
best reaction. This two step process gives rise to a randomized strategy for
player i at each step. In Remark 3.9 we saw that, no matter what actions
the opponents play, player i can guarantee that the empirical distribution of
action play converges almost surely to the set co (C(Γ, i)).
Under EUT, player i has a strategy that guarantees the almost sure con-
vergence of the empirical distribution of action play to the set C(Γ, i). This
convergence is related to the notion of no-regret learning. We now describe
this approach. Suppose at step t, player i imagines replacing action ai by
action a˜i, every time she played action ai in the past. Assuming the actions
of the other players did not change, her payoff would become xi(a˜i, aτ−i) for
all τ ≤ t, such that ati = ai, instead of xi(ai, aτ−i), while for all τ ≤ t, such
that ati 6= ai, it will continue to be xi(at). We define the resulting CPT regret
of player i for having played action ai instead of action a˜i as
Kti (ai, a˜i) := ξ
t
i(ai)Ri
[{(
ξt−i(a−i|ai), xi(a˜i, a−i), xi(ai, a−i)
)}
a−i∈A−i
]
,
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where
Ri [{(νl, zˆl, zl)}ml=1] := Vi ({(νl, zˆl)}ml=1)− Vi ({(νl, zl)}ml=1) (4.1)
is the difference in the CPT values of the lotteries {(νl, zˆl)}ml=1 and {(νl, zl)}ml=1.
We associate player i with CPT regrets
{
Kti (ai, a˜i), ai, a˜i ∈ Ai, ai 6= a˜i
)} at
each step t. Under EUT, this simplifies to
Kti (ai, a˜i) =
1
t
∑
τ≤t:aτi =ai
[xi(a˜i, a
τ
−i)− xi(aτ )], (4.2)
in agreement with the definition given in Hart and Mas-Colell [2000].
The following proposition shows the connection between regrets and cor-
related equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. Let (at)t≥1 be a sequence of action profiles played by the
players. Then lim supt→∞Kti (ai, a˜i) ≤ 0, for every i ∈ [n] and every ai, a˜i ∈
Ai, ai 6= a˜i, if and only if the sequence of empirical distributions ξt converges to
the set C(Γ) of CPT correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Since ∆(A) is a compact set, ξt converges to the set C(Γ) iff for every
convergent subsequence ξtk , say, converging to ξˆ, we have ξˆ ∈ C(Γ). Let
ξtk → ξˆ be a convergent subsequence. For each player i, and for every ai, a˜i ∈
Ai, ai 6= a˜i such that ξˆi(ai) > 0, we have,
Ktki (ai, a˜i)→ ξˆi(ai)Ri
[{(
ξˆ−i(a−i|ai), xi(a˜i, a−i), xi(ai, a−i)
)}
a−i∈A−i
]
by continuity of Vi(p, x) as a function of the probability vector p for a fixed
outcome profile x. The result is immediate from the definition of CPT corre-
lated equilibrium.
Player i is said to have a no-regret learning strategy if, irrespective of the
strategies of the other players, her regrets satisfy
P
(
lim sup
t→∞
Kti (ai, a˜i) ≤ 0
)
= 1, for every ai, a˜i ∈ Ai, ai 6= a˜i.
This is equivalent to asking if the vector of regrets
(
Kti (ai, a˜i), ai, a˜i ∈ Ai, ai 6= a˜i
)
),
converges to the negative orthant almost surely. This is related to the concept
of approachability, the setup for which is as follows. Consider a repeated two
player game, where now at step t, if the row player and the column player
play actions aˆtrow and aˆ
t
col respectively, then the row player receives a vector
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payoff ~x(aˆtrow, aˆ
t
col) instead of a scalar payoff. A subset S is said to be ap-
proachable by the row player, if she has a (randomized) strategy such that
no matter how the column player plays,
lim
t→∞ d
(
1
t
t∑
τ=1
~x(aˆtrow, aˆ
t
col), S
)
= 0, almost surely.
Blackwell’s approachability theorem Blackwell [1956] states that a convex
closed set S is approachable if and only if every halfspaceH containing S is
approachable.
Hart and Mas-Colell [2000] cast the repeated game with stage game Γ
in the above setup as a two player repeated game where player i is the row
player and the opponents together form the column player. Let ~x(aˆi, aˆ−i) be
the vector payoff when player i plays action aˆi and the others play aˆ−i, with
components given by
~xai,a˜i(aˆi, aˆ−i) =
{
xi(a˜i, aˆ−i)− xi(ai, aˆ−i) if aˆi = a˜i
0 otherwise,
for all ai, a˜i ∈ Ai, ai 6= a˜i. Under EUT, the average vector payoff of the row
player corresponds to the regret of player i (see Equation 4.2). Hart and
Mas-Colell [2000] show that the negative orthant is approachable for the
row player and hence player i has a no-regret learning strategy. Under CPT,
if the average vector payoffs were to match with player i’s regrets, then the
vector payoffs for the row player at step t turn out to depend on the empirical
distribution of action play up to step t. Indeed, the component corresponding
to the pair (ai, a˜i) of the vector payoff for the row player at step twhen player
i plays action aˆi and the others play aˆ−i should match the difference
(t+ 1)Kt+1i (ai, a˜i)− tKti (ai, a˜i).
And this difference depends on the empirical distribution of action play up
to step t, and hence in general changes with t.
The following example shows that under CPT, approachability of the non-
negative orthant need not hold. Blackwell’s sufficiency condition [Blackwell,
1956, Section 2] therefore does not hold with such state dependent payoffs.
In other words, it can happen under CPT that at least one of the players does
not have a no-regret learning strategy.
Example 4.2. Consider the 2-player repeated game from Example 3.1. Sup-
pose player 1 plays a no-regret learning strategy. Recall the following distri-
butions on player 2’s actions: σodd = (0.5, 0, 0.5, 0), σeven = (0, 0.5, 0, 0.5) and
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σunif = (0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25). We observed that player 1’s action 1 is not a
best response to σodd and σeven and player 1’s action 0 is not a best response
to σunif . For an integer T > 2, consider the following strategy for player 2:
• play mixed strategy σodd at step 1,
• play mixed strategy σeven at step 2,
• play mixed strategy σodd at steps 2T k < t ≤ T k+1, for k ≥ 0,
• play mixed strategy σeven at steps T k+1 < t ≤ 2T k+1, for k ≥ 0.
The following lemma implies that player 1 cannot have a no-regret learning
strategy.
Lemma 4.3. In the above example, for a suitable choice of T, δ˜ > 0 and ˜ > 0,
there exists an integer k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, we have
P
(
K¯k > ˜
)
> δ˜,
where
K¯k := [KT
k+1
1 (1,0)]
+ + [K2T
k+1
1 (0,1)]
+ + [K2T
k+1
1 (1,0)]
+,
and [·]+ := max{·, 0}.
Proof. Consider the subsequence of steps (tlodd)l≥1 when player 2 played σodd.
Let νlodd(a1, a2) denote the empirical distribution over those times of the ac-
tion profile (a1, a2), where a1 ∈ {0,1}, a2 ∈ {I,III}, i.e.
νlodd(a1, a2) :=
1
l
l∑
u=1
1{atuodd = (a1, a2)}.
Since player 2 is randomizing over her actions I and III, independently at all
the steps (tlodd)l≥1, we will show that, for sufficiently large l, v
l
odd(0, I) and
vlodd(0, III) are almost equal with high probability. To see this, observe that
the sequence (Ml, l ≥ 1) is a martingale, where
Ml := l × (νlodd(0,I)− νlodd(0,III)).
Indeed, letM l1 := (M1, . . . ,Ml), and we have
E[Ml+1 −Ml|M l1] = E[Ml+1 −Ml|M l1, at
l+1
odd
1 = 0]P (a
tl+1odd
1 = 0|M l1)
+ E[Ml+1 −Ml|M l1, at
l+1
odd
1 = 1]P (a
tl+1odd
1 = 1|M l1)
= E[1{atl+1odd = (0, I)} − 1{atl+1odd = (0, III)}|M l1, at
l+1
odd
1 = 0]P (a
tl+1odd
1 = 0|M l1) + 0
=
1
2
− 1
2
= 0,
25
where the last line follows from the fact that player 2 plays σodd at each of
the steps tlodd independently. Thus, for example by the Azuma-Hoeffding
inequality, for any δ > 0, there exists an integer l(1)δ > 1, such that for all
l ≥ l(1)δ ,
P
(
|νlodd(0,I))− νlodd(0,III)| < δ
)
> 1− δ. (4.3)
Similarly, we have an integer l(2)δ > 1, such that for all l ≥ l(2)δ ,
P
(
|νlodd(1,I))− νlodd(1,III)| < δ
)
> 1− δ. (4.4)
Now consider the sequence of steps (tleven)l≥1 when player 2 played σeven. Let
νleven(a1, a2) denote the empirical distribution over those times of the action
profile a1 ∈ {0,1}, a2 ∈ {II,IV}, i.e.
νleven(a1, a2) :=
1
l
l∑
u=1
1{atueven = (a1, a2)}.
We have an integer l(3)δ > 1, such that for all l ≥ l(3)δ ,
P
(
|νleven(0,II))− νleven(0,IV)| < δ
)
> 1− δ, (4.5)
and an integer l(4)δ > 1, such that for all l ≥ l(4)δ ,
P
(
|νleven(1,II))− νleven(1,IV)| < δ
)
> 1− δ. (4.6)
For a vector q ∈ RS and  > 0, let [q] :=
{
q˜ ∈ RS : |q˜(s)− q(s)| < ,∀s ∈ S}
denote the set of all vectors within  of q in the sup norm. Select positive con-
stants 3, c3, 2, c2, 1, c1 as follows:
• Let 3 < 1 and c3 be such that the regret R1(µ, x1(1, ·), x1(0, ·)) > c3
for all distributions µ ∈ [σunif ]3 (such constants exist because action
0 is not a best response to σunif ). Let δ3 := 3.
• Let 2 < 1 and c2 be such that the regret R1(µ, x1(0, ·), x1(1, ·)) > c2
for all distributions µ ∈ [σeven]2 (such constants exist because action 1
is not a best response to σeven). Let δ2 := 2δ3/4.
• Let 1 < 0.5 and c1 be such that the regret R1(µ, x1(0, ·), x1(1, ·)) > c1
for all distributions µ ∈ [σodd]1 (such constants exist because action 1
is not a best response to σodd). Let δ1 := 1δ2.
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Let T > 2/δ1 and k0 be such that
T k0+1 > max
{
t
l
(1)
δ1
odd, t
l
(2)
δ1
odd, t
l
(3)
δ1
even, t
l
(4)
δ1
even
}
.
If we take ˜ = min {δ2c1, 0.5δ3c2, (1− δ3)c3} and δ˜ = min{14
(
1
4 − δ1
)
, 34
(
1
4 − 3δ1
)},
then in Appendix A, we show that for all k ≥ k0,
P
(
K¯k > ˜
)
> δ˜1,
and that concludes the proof of the lemma.
5 Conclusion
We studied how some of the results from the theory of learning in games
are affected when the players in the game have cumulative prospect theory
preferences. For example, we saw that the notion of mediated games and
mediated CPT correlated equilibrium is more appropriate than the notion of
CPT correlated equilibrium while studying the convergence of the empirical
distribution of play, in particular for calibrated learning schemes. One can
ask similar questions with respect to other learning schemes such as follow
the perturbed leader [Fudenberg and Levine, 1995], fictitious play [Brown,
1951], etc. We leave this for future work. In general, it seems that the results
from learning in games continue to hold under CPT with slight modifications.
We also observed that the revelation principle does not hold under CPT.
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3.11 continued. Let ζ∗−i := µ˜−i(·|bi) = µ˜−i(·|b˜i) and let
a∗i := σi(bi) 6= σi(b˜i). By the assumption that the set C(Γ, i, a∗i ) does not
have any isolated points, there exists a sequence (ζˆ l−i)l≥1 of distinct distri-
butions in C(Γ, i, a∗i ) such that ζˆ
l
−i → ζ∗−i and (ζˆ l−i)l≥1 are all distinct from
the distributions (µ˜−i(·|bi),∀bi ∈ Bi). Further, let the sequence (ζˆ l−i)l≥1 be
such that |ζˆ l−i − ζ∗−i| < 1/l for all l ≥ 1. Consider an increasing sequence of
integers 1 = k1 < k2 < . . . that we define inductively as follows: Let kl be the
smallest integer greater than lkl−1 such that, for all k¯ ≥ kl, the empirical av-
erage of the action profiles of the opponents over steps {tk(bi), kl−1 < k < k¯}
is within 1/l distance from the distribution ζ∗−i in the sup norm. Such a kl ex-
ists since the empirical average of the action profiles of opponents over steps
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(tk(bi))k≥1 converges to ζ∗−i. If we now replace player i’s assessments ζ
∗
−i by
ζˆ l−i at steps t
k(bi) for kl ≤ k < kl+1, l ≥ 1, we have, for l ≥ 1, t ≥ tkl(bi) and
a−i ∈ A−i,
l∑
s=1
|ρ(ζˆs−i, a−i, t)− ζˆs−i(a−i)|
N(ζˆs−i, t)
t
≤
l−1∑
s=1
N(ζˆs−i, t)
t
+ |ρ(ζˆ l−i, a−i, t)− ζˆ l−i(a−i)|
≤ 1
l
+ |ρ(ζˆ l−i, a−i, t)− ζ∗−i(a−i)|+ |ζˆ l−i(a−i)− ζ∗−i(a−i)|
≤ 3
l
.
From this observation, it follows that player i’s assessments continue to be
calibrated even after the above replacement. Since the assessments {ζˆ l−i} are
distinct from the assessments (µ˜−i(·|bi),∀bi ∈ Bi), we can define action a∗i as
the best reaction to ζˆ l−i for all l ≥ 1. The above trick can be used to resolve all
instances where µ˜−i(·|bi) = µ˜−i(·|b˜i) but σi(bi) 6= σi(b˜i). Each time taking the
corresponding sequence {ζˆ l−i} distinct from all previously used assessments.
This solves the problem of defining best reaction for all the assessments and
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.12. Since n and |Ai|,∀i are finite, it is enough to show
that for any fixed i ∈ [n] and ai ∈ Ai, the set of all games Γ, for which the
set C(Γ, i, ai) has an isolated point, is a null set. Since the set of all games
for which any two payoffs of player i are equal, i.e. xi(a) = xi(a˜), a 6= a˜,
is a null set, we can restrict out attention to games where all the payoffs for
player i are distinct. Let (pii(1), pii(2), . . . , pii(|A−i|)) be a permutation of A−i
such that
xi(ai, pii(1)) > xi(ai, pii(2)) > · · · > xi(ai, pii(|A−i|)).
A game Γwith distinct payoffs for player i is completely determined by choos-
ing each of the following:
(i) xj(a) ∈ R for all j 6= i,
(ii) xi(a˜i, a−i) ∈ R for all a˜i 6= ai, a−i ∈ A−i,
(iii) a permutation (pii(1), pii(2), . . . , pii(|A−i|)) of A−i,
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(iv) the differences xi(ai, pii(t))− xi(ai, pii(t+ 1)) > 0 for all 1 ≤ t < |A−i|,
(v) xi(ai, pii(|A−i|) ∈ R.
Further, we observe that the Lebesgue measure λ can be obtained as the
product measure of the following:
(1) Lebesgue measure on xj(a) ∈ R for all j 6= i,
(2) Lebesgue measure on xi(a˜i, a−i) ∈ R for all a˜i 6= ai, a−i ∈ A−i,
(3) uniform distribution on the set of permutations of A−i,
(4) Lebesgue meaure on xi(ai, pii(t)) − xi(ai, pii(t + 1)) > 0 for all 1 ≤ t <
|A−i|,
(5) Lebesgue measure on xi(ai, pii(|A−i|)) ∈ R.
Suppose we fix (i)–(iv), then the game Γ is completely determined by
xi(a˜i, a−i) ∈ R. We will show that the set of all xi(ai, pii(|A−i|)) ∈ R, for
which the set C(Γ, i, ai) has isolated points, is a null set with respect to the
one dimensional Lebesgue measure on R. Then by Fubini’s theorem we have
the required result.
For any game Γ with payoffs (xi(a), i ∈ [n], a ∈ A), consider the function
F aii : ∆(A−i)→ R, given by
F aii (µ−i) := max
a˜i 6=ai
Ri[{(µ−i(a−i), xi(a˜i, a−i), xi(ai, a−i))}a−i∈A−i ],
where Ri[·] is as defined in Equation 4.1. Since the probability weighting
functions are assumed to be continuous, the CPT value function is continu-
ous with respect to the probability distribution, and hence so is the regret
function Ri[·] with respect to µ−i. Thus we get that the function F aii is con-
tinuous. For any δ ∈ R, let Γδ be the game with all its payoffs except those
corresponding to player i and action ai be same as that of the game Γ. Let the
payoffs corresponding to player i and action ai be given by xi(ai, a−i) + δ for
all a−i ∈ A−i. We now show that µ−i is an isolated point in the setC(Γδ, i, ai)
iff δ = F aii (µ−i) and µ−i is a strict local minima of the function F
ai
i .
Suppose µ−i is an isolated point in the set C(Γδ, i, ai). We have µ−i ∈
C(Γδ, i, ai) for all δ ≥ F aii (µ−i). Thus δ ≥ F aii (µ−i). If δ > F aii (µ−i) then
by the continuity of the function F aii , we will have a neighborhood around
the point µ−i that belongs to C(Γδ, i, ai). Since the domain ∆(A−i) itself
does not have any isolated points, the fact that µ−i is an isolated point of
C(Γδ, i, ai) implies that δ = F
ai
i (µ−i). If µ−i is not a strict local minima of
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F aii , then there exists a sequence of points (µ
t
−i)t≥1 converging to µ−i such
that F aii (µ−i) ≤ δ. Then the sequence (µt−i)t≥1 belongs to the set C(Γδ, i, ai),
contradicting the fact that µ−i is an isolated point in the set C(Γδ, i, ai).
To see the other direction of the iff statement above, note that δ = F aii (µ−i)
implies µ−i ∈ C(Γδ, i, ai). The fact that µ−i is a strict local minima of the
function F aii implies that there exists a neighborhood of µ−i in ∆(A−i) such
that F aii (µ˜−i) > δ for all µ˜−i in this neighborhood. This implies that the
point µ−i is an isolated point in the set C(Γδ, i, ai). This completes the proof
of the above iff statement.
To complete the proof of the proposition, it remains to show that the set
of all δ ∈ R, for which there exists a strict local minima µ−i of F aii such that
F aii (µ−i) = δ, is a null set with respect to the one dimensional Lebesgue
measure. We first prove that the set of all µ−i that are a strict local minima
of the function F aii is countable. Indeed, for each strict local minima µ
′
−i
there exists a pair of vectors with rational elements, (pµ
′
−i(a−i))a−i∈A−i and
(qµ
′
−i(a−i))a−i∈A−i , such that
pµ
′
−i(a−i) < µ′−i(a−i) < q
µ′−i(a−i), for all a−i ∈ A−i,
and for any µ−i ∈ ∆(A−i) such that
pµ
′
−i(a−i) < µ−i(a−i) < qµ
′
−i(a−i), for all a−i ∈ A−i,
we have F aii (µ−i) > F
ai
i (µ
′
−i). We note that there cannot exist two dis-
tinct strict local minima µ′−i 6= µ′′−i such that pµ
′
−i(a−i) = pµ
′′
−i(a−i) and
qµ
′
−i(a−i) = qµ
′′
−i(a−i) for all a−i ∈ A−i. Thus we have an injective map from
the set of all strict local minima of the function F aii to the set Q
2|A−i|. Hence
the set of all strict local minima is countable.
Thus the set of all δ ∈ R, for which there exists a strict local minima µ−i
of F aii such that F
ai
i (µ−i) = δ is also countable and hence a null set. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.3 continued. Let fk+11 denote the fraction of times player 2
plays σeven up to step t = T k+1. We have
fk+11 ≤
2T k
T k+1
. (A.1)
Let fk+12 denote the fraction of times player 2 plays σeven up to step t =
2T k+1. We have
fk+12 =
T k+1 + T
k+1−1
T−1
2T k+1
∈
[
1
2
,
1
2
+
1
T
]
, (A.2)
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where the last inclusion follows from the fact that T > 2. Let
fk+13 := ξ
Tk+1
1 (0).
Note that, fk+13 is a random variable in contrast with f
k+1
1 and f
k+1
2 . We have
the following two cases based on the probability of the event {fk+13 < 1−δ2}:
Case 1 [P (fk+13 < 1− δ2) > 1/4]. For k ≥ k0, we will show that,
ξT
k+1
(1, ·) ∈
[(
1− fk+13
2
, 0,
1− fk+13
2
, 0
)]
δ1
, (A.3)
with probability greater than (1/4 − δ1), conditioned on {fk+13 < 1 − δ2}.
Indeed, from Equation (A.1) and the assumption T > 2/δ1, we have
ξT
k+1
(1,II) + ξT
k+1
(1,IV) ≤ 2
T
< δ1,
and hence each term individually belongs to [0, δ1]. From (4.4), we have
|ξTk+1(1,I)− ξTk+1(1,III)| < δ1(1− fk+11 ) ≤ δ1,
with probability greater than (1− δ1). Consider the event
E1 :=
{
|ξTk+1(1,I)− ξTk+1(1,III)| < δ1
}
.
Then,
P (E1|fk+13 < 1− δ2)P (fk+13 < 1− δ2) + P (E1|fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2)P (fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2)
> 1− δ1.
Since P (fk+13 < 1 − δ2) > 1/4, we have P (fk+13 ≥ 1 − δ2) ≤ 3/4. Besides,
P (fk+13 < 1− δ2) ≤ 1 and P (E1|fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2) ≤ 1 since they are probabil-
ities. It then follows that,
P
(
|ξTk+1(1,I)− ξTk+1(1,III)| < δ1
∣∣∣fk+13 < 1− δ2) > 1/4− δ1.
Since
ξT
k+1
(1,I) + ξT
k+1
(1,II) + ξT
k+1
(1,III) + ξT
k+1
(1,IV) = 1− fk+13 ,
we have
ξT
k+1
(1,I) + ξT
k+1
(1,III) ∈
[
1− fk+13 − δ1, 1− fk+13
]
,
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and this in turn establishes (A.3), with probability greater than (1/4 − δ1),
conditioned on {fk+13 < 1− δ2}.
From (A.1), we know that player 2 plays σodd for most of the steps up
to step t = T k+1. Since action 1 is not a best response of player 1 for σodd,
we will now show that, if player 1 does not play action 0 for a sufficiently
high fraction of steps up to step t = T k+1, then she will have a considerably
large regret KT
k+1
1 (1,0). If f
k+1
3 < 1 − δ2, then (A.3) implies ξT
k+1
−1 (·|1) ∈
[σodd] δ1
δ2
and in that case, from the assumption δ1 = 1δ2, we have the regret
KT
k+1
1 (1,0) > δ2c1. Thus,
P (K¯k > δ2c1) ≥ P
(
[KT
k+1
1 (1,0)]
+ > δ2c1
)
≥ P
(
[KT
k+1
1 (1,0)]
+ > δ2c1
∣∣∣fk+13 < 1− δ2)P (fk+13 < 1− δ2)
>
1
4
(
1
4
− δ1
)
.
Case 2 [P (fk+13 < 1 − δ2) ≤ 1/4]: Let fk+14 be the fraction of times
player 1 plays action 0 from step T k+1 + 1 to step 2T k+1. We now show
that for k ≥ k0, the empirical distribution at step 2T k+1 is approximately as
shown in Table 5 within δ2 error, i.e. ξ2T
k+1 ∈ [µˆ]δ2 , with probability greater
than (1/4− 3δ1), conditioned on {fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2}.
Since player 2 plays σeven from step T k+1+1 to step 2T k+1, if fk+13 ≥ 1−δ2
then,
ξ2T
k+1
(1,I) + ξ2T
k+1
(1,III) ≤ ξTk+11 (1)/2 = (1− fk+13 )/2 ≤ δ2/2,
and hence each term is necessarily less than δ2, i.e.
ξ2T
k+1
(1,I), ξ2T
k+1
(1,III) ∈ [0, δ2]. (A.4)
Further, from equation (A.2), we have
ξ2T
k+1
(0,I) + ξ2T
k+1
(0,III) + ξ2T
k+1
(1,I) + ξ2T
k+1
(1,III) ∈ [0.5− δ1, 0.5],
and hence
ξ2T
k+1
(0,I) + ξ2T
k+1
(0,III) ∈ [0.5− δ1 − δ2/2, 0.5].
From (4.3), we have |ξ2Tk+1(0,I) − ξ2Tk+1(0,III)| < δ1(1 − fk+12 ) ≤ δ1, with
probability greater than (1− δ1). Consider the event
E2 :=
{
|ξ2Tk+1(0,I)− ξ2Tk+1(0,III)| < δ1
}
.
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Then,
P (E2|fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2)P (fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2) + P (E2|fk+13 < 1− δ2)P (fk+13 < 1− δ2)
> 1− δ1,
and since P (fk+13 < 1− δ2) ≤ 1/4, we have
P
(
|ξ2Tk+1(0,I)− ξ2Tk+1(0,III)| < δ1|fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2
)
> 3/4− δ1.
As a result, each of the two terms, ξ2T
k+1
(0,I) and ξ2T
k+1
(0,III), lie in the
interval [0.25− δ1− δ2/4, 0.25 + δ1], with probability greater than (3/4− δ1),
conditioned on {fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2}. Since 1 < 0.5 and δ1 = 1δ2, we have
ξ2T
k+1
(0,I), ξ2T
k+1
(0,III) ∈ [0.25− δ2, 0.25 + δ2], (A.5)
with probability greater than (3/4 − δ1), conditioned on {fk+13 ≥ 1 − δ2}.
From (A.1), we have
ξ2T
k+1
(0,II) + ξ2T
k+1
(0,IV) ∈ [0.5fk+14 , 0.5fk+14 + 0.5fk+11 ]
∈ [0.5fk+14 , 0.5fk+14 + δ1].
From (4.5) and the bound P (fk+13 < 1− δ2) ≤ 1/4, we have
ξ2T
k+1
(0,II), ξ2T
k+1
(0,IV) ∈ [0.25fk+14 − δ1, 0.25fk+14 + δ1], (A.6)
with probability greater than (3/4 − δ1), conditioned on {fk+13 ≥ 1 − δ2}.
Similarly, we get
ξ2T
k+1
(1,II), ξ2T
k+1
(1,IV) ∈ [0.25(1−fk+14 )− δ1, 0.25(1−fk+14 ) + δ1], (A.7)
with probability at least (3/4 − δ1), conditioned on {fk+13 ≥ 1 − δ2}. From
(A.4), (A.5), (A.6) and (A.7), we get,
P (ξ2T
k+1 ∈ [µˆ]δ2 |fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2) ≥ 1/4− 3δ1. (A.8)
We now consider the two scenarios based on fk+14 < 1 − δ3 or fk+14 ≥
1 − δ3. If fk+14 < 1 − δ3, then ξ2T
k+1 ∈ [µˆ]δ2 implies that ξ2T
k+1
−1 (·|1) ∈
[σeven](2δ2)/(0.5δ3). Indeed, since ξ
2Tk+1
1 (1) ≥ (1− fk+14 )/2 > 0.5δ3, normaliz-
ing ξ2T
k+1
(1, ·) by ξ2Tk+11 (1), we get
ξ2T
k+1
−1 (I|1), ξ2T
k+1
−1 (III|1) ∈ [0, δ2/(0.5δ3)],
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and
|ξ2Tk+1−1 (II|1)− ξ2T
k+1
−1 (IV|1)| ≤
2δ2
0.5δ3
.
Since
ξ2T
k+1
−1 (I|1) + ξ2T
k+1
−1 (II|1) + ξ2T
k+1
−1 (III|1) + ξ2T
k+1
−1 (IV|1) = 1,
we get, ξ2T
k+1
−1 (·|1) ∈ [σeven](2δ2)/(0.5δ3). Then, from the assumption δ2 =
2δ3/4, we have that the regret K2T
k+1
1 (1,0) ≥ 0.5δ3c2.
If fk+14 ≥ 1− δ3 and fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2, then ξ2T
k+1 ∈ [µˆ]δ2 implies that
ξ2T
k+1
−1 (·|0) ∈ [σunif ] δ3/4+δ2
1−δ3/2−δ2/2
. (A.9)
This is because µˆ(0, ·) ∈ [σunif ]δ3/4 and hence ξ2T
k+1
(0, ·) ∈ [σunif ]δ3/4+δ2 .
Since ξ2T
k+1
1 (0) ≥ 1 − δ3/2 − δ2/2, normalizing ξ2T
k+1
(0, ·) with ξ2Tk+11 (0)
gives (A.9). Then, from the assumptions 3 < 1, 2 < 1, δ2 = 2δ3/4 and
δ3 = 3, we have
δ3/4 + δ2
1− δ3/2− δ2/2 ≤
δ3/4 + δ3/4
1− δ3/2 ≤ 3.
Thus, ξ2T
k+1
−1 (·|0) ∈ [σunif ]3 , and hence K2T
k+1
1 (0,1) > (1− δ3)c3.
From the above two scenarios depending on fk+14 < 1 − δ3 or fk+14 ≥
1 − δ3, we obtain the following: if fk+13 ≥ 1 − δ2 and ξ2T
k+1 ∈ [µˆ]δ2 , then
K¯k > min{0.5δ3c2, (1− δ3)c3}. As a result, from Equation (A.8) we have,
P
(
K¯k > min{0.5δ3c2, (1− δ3)c3}
)
≥ P
(
K¯k > min{0.5δ3c2, (1− δ3)c3}|fk+13 ≥ 1− δ2
)
P (fk+13 < 1− δ2)
>
3
4
(
1
4
− 3δ1
)
.
For ˜ = min {δ2c1, 0.5δ3c2, (1− δ3)c3} and δ˜ = min{14
(
1
4 − δ1
)
, 34
(
1
4 − 3δ1
)},
from the above two cases we have, for all k ≥ k0,
P
(
K¯k > ˜
)
> δ˜1.
This completes the proof.
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I II III IV
0 0.25 0.25fk+14 0.25 0.25f
k+1
4
1 0 0.25(1− fk+14 ) 0 0.25(1− fk+14 )
Table 5: empirical distribution µˆ in example 4.2.
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